countries to be taken off the OECD blacklists while also instituting a new discourse of virtue for offshore finance. Due diligence is traditionally associated with corporate mergers and acquisitions. In this sense, it is a practice through which the parties to a merger spend time checking the balance sheets and legal histories of their potential partners before closing the deal. In the offshore world, due diligence involves checking the details of a person's or corporation's identities against potential wrongdoing. As I discuss below, it regrounds and recontextualizes the agent of offshore finance in a community of regard-in essence disallowing the "absolute freedom from everything personal." This development, I argue, also begs a series of questions about certain forms of inquiry in the human sciences, in particular the way ethics interfaces with social knowledge in some recent anthropological writings. A key assumption in scholarship on capitalism and finance is that quantification is as quantification does, that mathematical sophistication reduces the world to bare numbers and all human activity to mathematical calculations of risk. In contrast, Hirokazu Miyazaki and Caitlin Zaloom both demonstrate how, for various financial traders in Japan, Chicago, and London, the numbers and the calculations do not always refer to the commodities and contracts behind them, and they are not undertaken solely for the purposes of financial risk management or profit making.1 Zaloom finds among Chicago and London futures traders a corporeal investment in numbers, not just rational calculation. She documents the bodily practices traders develop around their work with numbers and how they develop affective relationships or a "feel" for them rather than seeing them entirely as a rational calculus. Indeed, for some, "the first step" of becoming a successful trader "is learning not to calculate" (Zaloom 2003 In what follows, I provide a sketch of a new form of managing financial risk offshore that relies not on calculation but on judgment and ethical self-fashioning.2 However, my goal is neither simply descriptive nor simply to counterpose "qualitative" modalities of due diligence with the "quantitative" ones that have received more attention. Also, I do not wish to rehearse the well-known arguments from Max Weber onward that achieving success in the domain of the economy depends on fostering one's standing within a community of regard and that the sociologist's task is to decide in which instances an ethical standard-"that specific kind of evaluating faith which claims to determine what is 'ethically good'" (Weber 1967 :7)-is brought to bear on human conduct in law or the economy. In other words, this is not an article about the sociology of trust in financial markets.
My argument is, more reflexively, about method. I am interested in how the modes of judgment being employed offshore in response to the OECD initiative resemble certain analytical strategies in the human sciences that have become popular in anthropology. Due diligence operates casuistically and in an openended fashion; it is not geared toward establishing truth or certainty so much as it warrants personal regard and ethical scrutiny. I argue below that it operates in a similar fashion to-indeed, it mirrors the form of-anthropological approaches to emergent phenomena that reflect on, even as they are guided by, ethical modes of inquiry, rather than more conventional forms of economic or political critique.3 Where those conventional forms of critique would look to expose the political or economic interests that lie behind actions or the social relationships structuring fields of discourse, by pulling back the veils of ideology to reveal the truth of the economy, finance, or the global situation, this article has a more modest goal: to try to understand this similarity of form between due diligence and anthropology. In doing so, it also seeks to complicate our picture of contemporary capitalisms by drawing attention to the nonquantifiable and the ethical that lie "inside" them. Recent work on contemporary capitalisms has challenged monolithic conceptions of the capitalist economy as bounded and whole in itself and as always fulfilling its teleology: to encompass the entire world and all aspects of life. This article, thus, contributes to an anthropology of the nonquantifiable and the ethical that stand alongside noncapitalist relations and inside contemporary capitalisms in a host of contingent and multiple phenomena that renders capitalism's own stories about itself considerably less sure and solid.4 One could argue that anthropology (as well as critical social science more generally) is also one of those ethical realms that insistently queries this triumphalist view of capitalism.
Before turning to these broader implications, I first briefly outline the response to the OECD initiative against harmful preferential tax regimes and then describe the signal innovation offshore that has emerged alongside it. My argument is not that a logic of quantification, calculation, objectification, abstraction, and risk is simply being replaced by a logic of judgment, evaluation, substantive rationality, and regard. Rather, analysts (financial and social scientific) have often seen these two poles as the only options for both financial management and critical inquiry even as they subtend one another. When critique takes the form simply of elevating one pole over the other, we might want to reconsider what it is we think we are revealing or whether revelation itself is an appropriate mode of analysis at all.
Naming and Shaming
The U.S. government under President Clinton lent its support and cooperation to the OECD program. In 2001, however, the administration of George W. Bush considered the effort to "name and shame," as it became known, an affront to the sovereignty of jurisdictions and a form of regulatory "overreach" that has dire implications for sovereignty at home. As then Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill put it, the Bush administration was "troubled by the underlying premise that low tax rates are somehow suspect and by the notion that any country, or group of countries, should interfere in any other country's decision about how to structure its own tax system." Furthermore, the United States, O'Neill stated, "would not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems" (O'Neill 2001:1).
A host of lobbying groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and coalitions jumped into the fray. The Center for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP), a nonprofit lobbying organization based in the United States, was founded specifically to challenge the OECD initiative and to promote tax competition. It argued that tax competition should be encouraged because "it is an important check on excessive government" (CFP n.d.). The CFP claimed that the OECD initiative was an "attack" on taxpayers, free trade, sovereignty, and privacy. It charged the OECD with "empire-building." It spearheaded the formation of the Coalition for Tax Competition, which includes the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and a number of other right wing, libertarian, and Christian organizations (such as the Discovery Institute, which promotes creationism in American public schools).
Parties to the controversy, however, did not line up neatly along a left-right political divide. The generally left-leaning U.S. Congressional Black Caucus joined the Bush administration in opposing the OECD initiative. In a letter archived by the CFP and signed by notable progressive congressional representatives such as Maxine Waters, Barbara Lee, and Charles Rangel, the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus expressed the concern that the OECD initiative would "impose economic harm on developing nations" and went on to promote the virtues of "the free flow of capital" in "improving economic conditions in poorer nations" by providing governments with "funds that are critically needed to provide education, health care, and social services" (U.S. Congressional Black Caucus 2001). Statements from CFP, the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus, and the Bush administration resonated with statements from Caribbean leaders such as Robert Sanders, senior ambassador from Antigua to the United Kingdom, that the initiative was "nothing less than a determined attempt to bend other countries to [the OECD's] will... a form of neocolonialism in which the OECD is attempting to dictate the tax economic systems and structures of other nations for the benefit of the OECD's member states" (Sanders 2001) . Caribbean leaders such as Julian Francis of the Bahamas Central Bank accused the OECD of "bullying" and Ambrose George, Dominica's finance minister, called its actions a threat to the "economic sovereignty" in the region (Kelly 2000; Government of Dominica 2000-01).5
Sovereignty was the keyword of the OECD and its allies as well. In this worldwide upsurge of critical attention to tax havens and money laundering, the OECD was joined by NGOs such as Oxfam and Christian Aid in arguing that tax competition was eroding the ability of states to finance themselves and, thus, was eroding their sovereignty. Seiichi Kondo, OECD deputy secretary, put it this way, in a speech in 2002:
The OECD's project on counteracting harmful tax practices is part of a wider initiative to promote good governance in a globalised economy. Globalisation has enormous potential to improve living standards around the world. But it also brings risks, including the risk of abuses of the free market system. The activities of tax havens distort the free flow of capital and undermine the ability of governments to finance the legitimate expectations of their citizens for publicly provided goods and services. By providing a framework within which all countries--developed and developing-can work together to fight harmful tax practices, the OECD seeks to encourage transparent and fair tax competition. [Kondo 2002:1] In its first report on the matter, "Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue" (OECD 1998), the OECD identified two types of harmful offshore activity: classic tax havens, with no or only nominal tax on business entities, and "harmful preferential tax regimes," characterized by "ring fencing," which separates nonresident corporate persons from domestic economies and taxes and denies to resident corporate persons the same privileges granted to foreign ones. The report also challenged the "lack of transparency" in the jurisdictions where these activities occur.6
In the years that followed the initial 1998 OECD report, a number of other . Each of these utopias suggests a critical language to offset the others: so, for example, the welfare-state utopia is often used to criticize the financialized utopia. In the debate over the OECD initiative, however, each utopia appeared as method and object of attack from all sides and not according to any discernable logic. This, in turn, mirrors the analytical impasse in the human sciences that has resulted from skepticism of the metanarratives informing critical inquiry: on what do we ground our critique when we can no longer appeal to these utopian visions?
The discourse inaugurated by the OECD obviates these bankrupt utopias by introducing a new term that unsettles their conventional referents.9 This new term is "harm." The language of harm assumes that offshore havens wound rich and powerful countries by siphoning off their revenue, to the detriment of hardworking, tax-paying citizens at home. Here, harm partakes of a welfare statism that casts the state as protector and nurturer. NGO critics of offshore finance try to demonstrate the harm it causes Third World countries whose elites squirrel away their ill-gotten gains in microstates and the harm it causes microstates by limiting their options in the global economy and furthering what Hampton and Christensen call their "mismanaged dependency" (2002:1663). Caribbean leaders, for their part, view the OECD's report as interfering with the region's "recovery" from sustained and repeated-one might even say eternal--crises. In short, the debate on "harmful" tax practices was animated by a pastoral grammar: as with the Christian virtues that purportedly inspire some of the parties to the OECD debate, it is concerned with care, nurture, and, as I argue below, the disposition of the soul.
To get off the blacklists, tax havens and other shamed jurisdictions adopted a set of bureaucratic procedures that met with OECD approval. In most cases, these new procedures required legislative changes; in some, they also required restructuring regulatory agencies involved in finance and banking. Due diligence procedures formed the centerpiece of the bureaucratic effort. It is the technique held up above all others as the solution to the problems of harmful tax competition, money laundering, tax evasion, financial fraud, and the ills associated with harmful preferential tax regimes. Due diligence has emerged offshore mainly to make sure those seeking to incorporate there are, in fact, who they say they are. The assertion of identity is supposed to guard against wrongdoing.
The term bears a family resemblance to the pastoral discourse of harm and explicitly invokes ethical conduct (Foucault 1982:213-215) .1o I argue below that due diligence reconfigures the discussion over "harmful tax practices" by routing it through a species of bureaucratic review that is deemed to warrant ethical behavior. Due diligence invokes common-law notions of "reasonable man," in contrast to self-interested and rational "economic man," to assess whether or not "reasonable care" has been taken to ascertain the identities of offshore entities. This points up a problem for critical analysis of contemporary capital mobility and its sovereignties (not to mention money laundering interdiction!): when reasonable man trumps economic man, critical analysis is put in the position of revindicating economic man, thus performing the expiration of the paradigm that set the two against each other in the first place and making explicit that the two were never so separate or contradictory as we might have imagined. Traditional kinds of criticism, then, like the financial, welfare state, and world government utopias of the contending parties to the OECD debate, reveal their bankruptcy in the face of "unrepresentably complex" (Fortun 2001 :18) ethical and systemic effects that we cannot comfortably map onto different subject positions, political programs, economic interests, and so on. If we try, we get "whiplashed," as a former legislative analyst put it to me when I attempted to make such a map. To quote Kim Fortun, "globalization The BVI Code of Practice also makes provisions for a third-party mediator between regulated and relevant persons. Dubbed an "introducer," this third-party mediator-a registered agent, for example-is most often (if not almost always) the linchpin in due diligence. The introducer quite literally "introduces" the regulated person to the territory and to the regulatory authority of the BVI. And the introducer is required to "establish and maintain identification procedures... as soon as reasonably practicable after contact is first made" with the relevant person (section 6[1]). On the ground, this means that the introducer is responsible for obtaining and maintaining a record of the name and contact information of the regulated person and a copy of the passport or other identifying document of the regulated person's agent (assuming the regulated person is a corporate entity). Caribbean Corporate Services, Ltd., a BVI trust company that acts as an agent for regulated persons and boasts a predominantly British Virgin Islander staff, requires a bit more information in the form of a standardized curriculum vitae (CV), along with letters of reference that adhere to the following recommended form (see Figure 1) . I am interested in the work of such letters of reference and the CV. As is probably obvious, on their face, they do little to guarantee absolutely the "actual" identity of a potential client (leaving to one side the very possibility of such identity for the moment). Even if there were no black market in identity documents, the cash-and-carry citizenships offered by other Caribbean countries, such as Dominica, mean that just because a name appears on an internationally valid passport does not guarantee that the bearer of the passport "is" the person therein and therefore possesses the warrant of a sovereign authority.12 But this is, I think, beside the point. Due diligence does not operate under the sign of certainty. Rather, it proceeds via the legal doctrine of reasonable care, the care that is "due" in due diligence. Reasonable care, established in the common law of torts, is situational, contextual, and case by case. The concept is explicitly gendered.13 Reasonable men, as one might expect, carry out reasonable care. In a satirical essay rendered as an opinion in a fictitious case, the essayist and politician Sir Alan Patrick Herbert in the early 20th century characterized reasonable man as follows (before sarcastically dismissing the possibility of a reasonable woman):14 This noble creature stands in singular contrast to his kinsman the Economic Man, whose every action is prompted by the single spur of selfish advantage and directed to the single end of monetary gain. The Reasonable Man is always thinking of others; prudence is his guide, and "Safety First," if I may borrow a contemporary catchword, is his rule of life.... He is one who invariably looks where he is going, and is careful to examine the immediate foreground before he executes a leap or bound; who neither star-gazes nor is lost in meditation when approaching trap-doors or the margin of a dock; who records in every case upon the counterfoils of cheques such ample details as are desirable, scrupulously substitutes the word "Order" for the word "Bearer," crosses the instrument "a/c Payee only," and registers the package in which it is despatched; who never mounts a moving omnibus, and does not alight from any car while the train is in motion; who investigates exhaustively the bona fides of every mendicant before distributing alms, and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog before administering a caress;.., .who never swears, gambles, or loses his temper; who uses nothing except in moderation, and even while he flogs his child is meditating only on the golden mean. [Herbert 1935 The committee drew a clear line of causation from reputational risk to other interrelated forms of risk but gave priority to reputational risk in the report, seeing it as the linchpin of other forms of risk: "Reputational risk poses a major threat to banks, since the nature of their business requires maintaining the confidence of depositors, creditors and the general marketplace" (2001:4). Reputational risk, the report continues, refers to "the potential that adverse publicity" will negatively impact "confidence in the integrity of the institution" (2001:4). This is a form of risk that cannot be managed through quantitative calculation; instead, it is managed through the evaluative procedures of due diligence. Thus, it replicates the work of the CV and letters of reference on another level of scale. Care for the reputation adheres both in the institution offering offshore financial services and the entity that seeks to use those services. Reputational risk adheres also in the jurisdiction within which financial activity takes place. Here, then, the work involves mitigating reputational risk through evaluative, not quantitative, procedures stitching together welfare-statist concerns over the negative effects of tax competition with those seeking to foster and deepen such competition.
The report of the Basel committee recommends procedures for setting up customer acceptance policies and for customer identification and pays special attention to people it terms "potentates" in the first draft of its report but whom it renames "politically exposed persons" (PEPs): former or current heads of state or other public figures who might "expose a bank to significant reputational risks" (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2001:10). "Accepting and managing funds from corrupt PEPs will severely damage the bank's own reputation and can undermine public confidence in the ethical standards of an entire financial centre" (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2001:10). The report also stresses that any intermediaries or "introducers" should be scrutinized, as well, to make sure that they are "fit and proper" and that the introducers are also "exercising the necessary due diligence" (2001:9). Doing due diligence in the Basel report and in Caribbean practice, thus, sets in motion the reasonable, the fit, and the proper in an international arena of regard warranted by care. And it is to be done at every level of scale, because reputational risk adheres to every party involved in a banking transaction as well as the states within which such transactions take place. It thereby has the potential to undermine the confidence subtending the international financial system itself. Due diligence all the way down.
Review
Due diligence reminds me of review in another domain, one that is also based on the particulars of a person's identity, references, and CV. The academic personnel review process in the university, like due diligence, is about a particular kind of recontextualization, reputation, and regard. It also replaces certainty with scrutiny. "Putting the screw in scrutiny," as they say, entails "checking the particulars": Are items properly recorded on a CV and on a standard form called an Addendum to the Biography as required in the review for promotion of faculty on most campuses of the University of California system? Do items listed on the addendum actually exist? To arrive at a judgment, the reviewer does not consider the material reality of the items so much as the consistency of their recording on the CV and on the addendum. "If it is confusing, then I get suspicious." If there is a discrepancy, then the reviewer might question the materiality of the item and bring it to bear on the case: The reviewer will either look at the item, if it is present in the file, or request it, if it is not.
Note that the meaningful "content" of such items is not particularly important at this point and that their existence is only at issue if their recording on the addendum causes the reviewer to suspect, as Heidegger put it in relation to counterfeit coin, "there is something not quite right here" (Heidegger 1949:294). Heidegger argued that the distinction between the genuine and the false depends not on the process of discovery and adjudication of a thing's reality but rather a thing's agreement with what we already in advance "really" mean when we call something true or real. It is not the thing that is of interest but the moral weight of the proposition. And this interest generates a specific return: the effect of the real inhering in the thing.
In jurisdictions with "introducers," the people doing due diligence evaluate documents on the basis of whether an introducer is known and valued. The introducer, in turn, makes a claim to a regulated person's value based on the latter's reputation and regard. In a personnel file, letters from external evaluators take on more weight if the letter is from someone who is familiar with the personnel review system and can, therefore, be trusted to make appropriate judgments about a candidate's relative standing in relation to that system. Letters acquire additional weight when they are "evaluative and analytical," meaning that they address the work of the candidate in a manner that generates confidence that the letter writer has actually carefully read and thought about the work. This is an important point: What the evaluator actually says about the work may be less crucial to the outcome of the review than that the evaluator says it in a manner that is "evaluative." Criticisms of a candidate's work, rendered in evaluative and analytical language, may help the candidate more than "testimonial," "puffery," or "praise." Scathing criticisms devoid of evaluative language can be dismissed as ad hominem. A frank evaluation warrants the moral authority of the evaluator, as well as of other levels of review, and a higher level of review can use the evaluative nature of the letter to be "reasonably" certain that the candidate "merits consideration" for advancement or promotion.
If I have slipped easily between the language of academic personnel review and due diligence, it is because the two practices share a form. Note the recursivity of review, like the recursivity of due diligence, which uses ethical modes of knowledge to guarantee adherence to an order of conduct that in turn assays a customer's or candidate's reputation and warrants a bank's or university's ability to In the process of review, facts are less important than their ethical warrants. The ethical warrant here is not just a simplifying technology (after Luhmann 1998) that helps some actors know whether other actors can be trusted. For one thing, the work of a CV and letters of introduction is to visibilize natural personshuman agents-while invisibilizing corporate persons; thus, it attempts to ground corporate agencies in human beings even if such humans do not, strictly speaking, have any control over their corporate actions.17 For another thing, review in any of its forms, from due diligence to academic personnel, reiterates a certain kind of knowledge: ethical and casuistic, not ontological and certain. If anything, then, review recomplexifies. The future cannot be known, and so due diligence relies on forms of knowledge that are situational and always understood to be partial and provisional and based on the moral weight of its own propositions. They can be continually revised, and in some cases, regulations demand that they be continually revised. Due diligence works with the networked complexity of fact and value, reality and its evaluation, while ungrounding ultimate claims to the "real" and putting in abeyance the desire to stabilize the personhood of regulated persons. To fulfill that desire would be to slow offshore finance to a halt-not a speed bump, but a speed trap catching everyone. The knowledge produced through review cannot strive for a total view of the picture, as if taken from a position above clients' financial practices but, rather, muddles through and alongside those practices. KYC recognizes such knowledge can never be "fully" attained, and not simply because identity as such is always in motion. Duly diligent knowledge is asymptotic, its reasonableness approaching but never quite meeting the curve of truth. "Reasonable Man" gives scrutiny, not certainty, and although scrutiny magnifies the force and weight of a judgment (similar to Archimedes's lever), certainty as such dissipates in the endeavor. 18 If . I suggest that due diligence is the form of this ethical practice, offshore. It is not concerned about the economic motives of its regulated persons or their politics; and it does not demand "accuracy" in reporting. Instead, due diligence gathers material for a process of judgment that will allow one to be reasonably certain that one has taken reasonable care and reasonable steps ethically to warrant a regulated person's identity. This is the kind of knowledge that KYC produces and that, reflexively, loops back to the subject of knowledge to warrant its reputation in the arena of international financial and regulatory regard. Due diligence reroutes knowledge and obviates the discourse on sovereignty via the ethical. It is casuistic in that it eschews definitive conclusions in the name of both facilitating practice and being subject to renewed review at some unspecified point in the future, given changing conditions or reconfigured personalities.
Techniques of Self-Fashioning
In doing due diligence, people are not simply verifying the identity of a client.
They are engaging in a form of practice that always has the potential to fold back on itself and is provisional, probabilistic, and open-ended. Indeed, the ends are never really known in advance. You can never tell where knowing your customer might lead, either now, or in the future, or in pasts laundered yet still possibly recoverable or recontextualizable. The discourse on sovereignty that seemingly frames and spurs the debate on harmful tax competition allows this work of recontextualization to muddle along. It attempts to bring clarity to what is always already essentially murky. But as it does so, and as those involved in due diligence-participants and analysts alike-realize they are all enmeshed, if asymmetrically, critical analysis becomes a matter of "being well versed in" this enmeshment "rather than being able to simply illuminate and clarify a reality that is uncontested or unproblematic" ( (Strathern 1988:17) . The extension of the symbols creates a parallel knowledge to that of the people whose words and texts impinge on the setting down of my own. The form of the analysis is recursive and processual, and, just as in the conversations it "reports," it returns back to its beginning point after detours through that which it and its subjects has blocked from view, like reasonableness, which "is an idea that is worth contemplating on a continuing basis" (Strahlendorf 2003:29) In volume two of The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault documented his theoretical shift first from studying "games of truth ... in their interplay with one another" to studying "games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject" and then to an inquiry into "the history of desiring man" (Foucault 1985:6) . Writing this history, Foucault noted, required inquiry into the "hermeneutics of the self" (1985:6), the "arts of existence" (1985:10) by which "desiring men ... make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria" (1985:11) . It is by way of such aesthetic values and stylistic criteria that the "Reasonable Men" doing due diligence evaluate the "desiring men" seeking to incorporate offshore.
If we turn for a moment to those "desiring men" offshore, we can track a movement parallel to a history of economic development. In the BVI and much of the Anglophone Caribbean, offshore finance was one outcome of a struggle between merchant elites and agricultural-industrial-state sector elites. Where mid-20th century economic development strategy emphasized governmentsupported investment in production through laws called "Pioneer Industry Acts," the financial paradigm interdigitated with merchant elites' circulatory imaginaries. In those imaginaries, "desiring man" was also "Satisficing Man," a complex adaptive corporate person whose identities were fragile, ephemeral, untraceable, or dispersed, in the name of mobility and secrecy, and not necessarily always optimality (Maurer 1995 In contrast to the "Kantian Man," however, imagine the community of regard, or the jury, or the review panel; imagine its aesthetic form and its arts of existence. That community of regard continues along in the making of knowledges that asymptotically approach truths. Because the charge to KYC is without end, the deliberations of these reasonable men are, in theory, also without end. Like juries, however, their passions fade, their stomachs growl, their heads ache, and they reach an assessment, a review, an evaluation that is made to stand for now, not forever. This is, after all, the essence of casuistry. This reasonable man is a "Dissipative Man"-he tires out after a while, "reasonably faithful" to the truth, but that is all one can reasonably expect. This idea of reason, then, far from Gluckman's universal but not subject to Bohannan's relativizing critique either, is a movement, made real in its becomings and always made from and making new problematics that coemerge and trundle along their own parallel and intertwining paths (Deleuze 1994: 168-211, see also Smith 2003) .
In making the claim that the idea of reason in due diligence is not the universal standard of Kant but an emergence along parallel tracks to forms of ethical inquiry, I also make a claim about the manner in which we conceive of ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that, in Foucault's genealogical method, truth is always "an unrecognized exercise of power in the abasement of the self or of others" (MacIntyre 1990:205).21 MacIntyre worries that the genealogical method nonetheless has to rely on language that presupposes the very "ascriptions of both identity and continuity to persons" that the genealogical method was meant to problematize (1990:205). In effect, MacIntyre argues, the genealogist has laundered his or her intellectual currency and in the process reveals his or her own putative stability as a subject. "If the genealogist is inescapably one who disowns part of his or her own past, then the genealogist's narrative presupposes enough of unity, continuity, and identity to make such disowning possible" (1990:214). Where MacIntyre sees genealogy and his own form of universal reason and virtue ethics in terms of mutual and unending "hostilities" (1990:215), however, I prefer to think of the way the two subtend one another, much as quantitative and qualitative forms of risk management collude in the creation and regulation of finance.
The problem, at least for offshore finance, is that one desperately wants easy answers, even if they are rendered according to an apparently complex aesthetic. This is why the drawings of Mark Lombardi have become so appealing (see Figure 4) . Lombardi was an artist who obsessively combed newspapers and other public sources for information on criminal and corporate networks. He traced out patterns of interconnection onshore and offshore; many of the nodes are important personages-PEPs in the phrase of the Bank for International Settlements. We are told that after September 11, 2001 , an FBI agent came to the Whitney Museum of American Art to study Lombardi's drawing, BCCI-ICIC &FAB, 1972-91 (4th version), looking for "clues" about terrorist financing (Hobbs 2003:11) . But because one never knows the nature of the connection indicated on the drawing by the line and because one should never accept that the nodes are the solid, unproblematic personages of liberal legalism, one will probably never find "answers" as such in Lombardi's drawings. Lombardi himself dissipated in the effort, in his own suicide. At the same time, however, Lombardi's drawings, like reasonable care, make new amalgamations, new assemblages, new knots, and new ultimately dissipative practices. Deleuze writes, of Foucault's notion of a dispositif "it is a tangle, a multilinear ensemble" (1992:159). It is not a system or a whole, or something that can be grasped by way of its contexts or its grounds. Precisely because it cannot be grasped as a whole or in terms of its grounds, it compels an aesthetic of the "Reasonable Man," seeking not certainty but rather engaging in the embodied activity of scrutiny. This "Reasonable Man," I suggest, differs from Gluckman's in that it places the question of the universal standard in abeyance, or to one side, and moves along doing due diligence in the meantime. Perhaps reasonable care, then, is not simply a new pastoral grammar of governance. Perhaps is it not just the opposite pole of a mode of governance and finance that operates according to depersonalized calculation and universal abstraction. Perhaps, it is, in addition, a "going parallel and becoming plural" (Rotman 2000:78), multiple mutual emergences that tire yet trundle along with the worn-out utopias of the age, all mutually contradictory yet co-occurring.
Lombardi gives us a certain enjoyment-we think we have discovered something when we look at his elegant diagrams. All we find there, however, is the sustenance of our own ideal(ist) projects, the denial of the asymptotic relation between reasonable care and truth in the clean lines and clear nodes of the network he traces. I suggest a mode of analysis that will allow us to feel the exhaustion, to admit the tiresomeness, and to throw up our hands and make a cut through the dense lateralizations of knowledge the offshore affords without allowing us the comfort that we have found the first, the last, or even the correct word.
Notes 17. I am grateful to Annelise Riles to pointing out the importance of the obviation of the natural and corporate person here.
18. I would like to thank Stefan Helmreich for the mathematical metaphor, and for encouraging me to think about "Reasonable Man" via "Dissipative Man, in a bar somewhere, confused about the check" (e-mail to author, March 6, 2004). See Rotman 1993 on dissipative counting, proving the practical limit of the infinite.
19. And yet, as an anonymous reviewer reminded me, "some of the most imaginative thinkers in our fields... are precisely those that have had the most trouble getting through these review processes."
20. An anonymous reviewer cogently remarks that the OECD member states most opposed to tax havens-Germany and France-have long rejected the kinds of arguments from tradition, custom, and precedent that underlie the common law. Thus, there may be connections to explore between common-law conceptions of the reasonable man and common-law tax havens. 
